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Abstract 
 
This paper will analyse the impact of the EU conditionality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) and its efficacy in promoting democratic changes in this 
country. It will be argued that as BiH is a unique case, its constitutional 
constraints must be taken into account because every reform that affects the 
difficult balance between the three main ethno-religious groups of BiH is 
perceived as a nationality-sensitive issue and is therefore vulnerable to political 
pressure. With reference to two specific situations where EU has demanded the 
BiH political elites to adopt EU-compatible reforms, namely the police reform 
process and the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci ruling, it will be argued 
that the use of the conditionality tool has increased inter-ethnic polarization 
among the political parties, thus preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from moving 
forward in the EU integration process. 
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EU Conditionality on Nationality-Sensitive 
Matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Promoting 
Democracy or Maintaining the Status Quo?  
Emilio Vettori 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has become the main 
external actor in the transition from authoritarian rule in most of the 
countries born from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička  Federativna  Republika 
Jugoslavija (SFRJ). By offering EU membership as a policy goal for domestic 
elites, the EU has successfully supported the transition to democracy of these 
countries that in 2004 and 2007 were involved in the Eastern Enlargement. In 
all these countries the integration perspective was a powerful incentive that 
induced the domestic elites to comply with the strict set of conditions that 
the aspiring candidate countries have to fulfil to be admitted as full members 
in the EU (the so-called Copenhagen criteria). After the launch of the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999, the same perspective was offered to 
the Western Balkan countries (WB) and was confirmed after at the Feira 
European Council (2000) and the Thessaloniki Council (2003). Among these 
countries, however, BiH, in particular, is lagging behind its neighbours and is 
considered the ‘worst in the class’.
1 In BiH, the membership perspective has 
not been an effective inducement to domestic political elites to adopt key 
reforms necessary to enable the country to move forward both in its 
democratization and integration process. Following the external incentive 
model of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this article will argue that, as 
perceived by the BiH political elites, the costs of compliance with EU 
requirements exceed the benefits of membership.
2 The nationality issue, in 
particular, worked as a filter for the actions and the decisions of the main 
political parties in BiH).
3  Hence it has put substantial constraints on the 
implementation of the integration agenda set by the European Commission in 
every EU-demanded reform that affects the difficult balance between the 
main ethnic groups of BiH.  
 
 
1   Knaus, Gerald and Bender, Krisof, “The Worst in Class: How the International Protectorate Hurts the 
European Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, ESI-European Stability Initiative, Berlin-Brussels-
Istanbul 2007, at www.esiweb.org. 
2   Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrike, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to 
the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, 11(4) Journal of European Public Policy 
2004, 661-679. 
3   Freyburg, Tina and Richter, Solveig, “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political 
Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, 17(2) Journal of European Public Policy 2010, 263-281. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap    6  edap@eurac.edu 
2. EU Democracy Promotion Through Conditionality in the WB: 
Mission (Almost) Accomplished? 
Securing peace and stability in the Balkan region has always been a primary 
issue and matter of concern for the European Union and its Member States. 
After the violent break-up of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
has shown the weakness of the EU Common Foreign and Security  Policy 
(CFSP), the creation of stable and democratic states in the EU periphery has 
become a main foreign policy and strategic issue for the European Union.
4 To 
reach these goal the EU has developed several instruments of external action 
and has become the main international actor in the democratization process 
of the WB countries. This EU commitment reflects a major change in the post-
Cold-War international system in which democracy and human rights 
promotion is now a major objective of international bodies, such as the UN 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and a 
foreign policy tool of both US and EU.
5 Especially in the Balkans, the EU has 
taken the lead of the international efforts to promote democracy and 
strengthen human rights.
6 While the EU cooperates with and coordinates its 
policies with the other international actors involved, with the UN, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), OSCE, and the US having a strong 
influence,
7  the ‘Balkan question’ remains fundamentally  a European 
responsibility that directly affects the credibility of the CFSP, as clearly 
stated in the first European security strategy in December 2003.
8  
This commitment was first expressed after the war in Kosovo when the EU 
changed its approach toward the Western Balkans, that was focused initially 
only on development aid and financial and humanitarian assistance.
9  The 
foundation of this change was the 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern that 
clearly promised candidate status for EU membership to all the WB countries 
(Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) able to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria. These criteria, set for the Central and East European 
Countries (CEECs) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, establish a set of 
political, economic, and normative conditions for EU membership and require: 
(a) the achievement of stable institutions capable of guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, 
(b) the existence of a functioning market economy, and (c) the capacity to 
 
 
4   Kopstein, Jeffrey, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion”, 29(2) The Washington 
Quarterly 2006, 85-98. 
5   Boutros, Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, United Nations (Dept. of Public Information, New 
York 1996), points 56-59. 
6   Youngs, Richard, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy”, Working Document 
No. 167, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2001. 
7   Bose, Sumantra, Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (Hurst & 
Co, London, 2002). 
8   Solana, Javier, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, First European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003. 
9   Boerzel, Tania, “Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of 
Limited Statehood”, paper prepared for the ERD Workshop “Transforming Political Structures: 
Security, Institutions and Regional Integration Mechanisms”, Florence, 2009. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU and the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic, and monetary union (acquis communitaire).
10  
Offering the prospect of EU membership is one of the EU’s strongest policy 
tools to promote democratic changes in non-member countries and is a 
powerful incentive for domestic actors to make democratic and EU-
compatible reforms. Especially in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
EU has acted as a transformative power
11  and has played a key role in 
anchoring to democracy the transitions from authoritarian rule in most of the 
states born from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav 
federation.
12 Within about 15 years, stable liberal democracies were created 
in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, which has led to the 
Eastern Enlargement being generally considered the EU’s most successful 
foreign policy
13 and the most influential democracy promotion ever.
14 In all 
these countries, the potential EU membership proved to be a strong 
inducement for the domestic elites to comply with the strict set of conditions 
that the aspiring candidate countries have to fulfil in order to be admitted as 
full members of the EU. Political conditionality has proven to be a powerful 
instrument that improves the standard of protection of rights and freedoms in 
third countries, especially substantive aspects of democracy such as 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and human and minority rights.
15  
However, when looking at the transitions from authoritarian rule in the 
former Yugoslav countries the outcomes appear to be more varied. According 
to the Freedom House data collected between 1992 and 2012 for its regular 
reports about freedom in the world and the path of democracy in the former 
communist countries, among the WBs only Slovenia, which joined the EU in 
 
 
10  See European Commission, Enlargement – Accession criteria, at  
  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm. 
11   Schimmelfennig, Frank, “The Normative Origins of Democracy in the European Union: Towards a 
Transformationalist Theory of Democratization”, NCCR Working Paper No. 39, 2009; Manners, Ian, 
“Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in. Terms?”, 40(2) JCMS 2002, 235-258; Manners, Ian, 
“The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, 25 Journal of 
International Studies  2006, 167-180; Tocci, Natalie, “Conflict Resolution in the European 
Neighbourhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor”, European University Institute 
Working Paper Series 2004; Tocci, Natalie (ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The 
European Union and its Global Partners, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008; Tocci, 
Natalie et al., “The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor”, CEPS working document 
n. 281  2008; Grabbe, Heather, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through 
Conditionality in Central Eastern Europe (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006).  
12   Youngs, Richard, “Democracy Promotion as External Governance?”, 16(6) Journal of European 
Public Policy  2009, 895-915; Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrike, “Governance by 
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, 11(4) 
Journal of European Public Policy  2004, 661-679; Vachudova, A. M., “Democratization in 
Postcommunist Europe: Illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of International Actors”, CES Working 
Paper no. 139 2006. 
13  Schimmelfennig, Frank and Scholtz, Hanno, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European 
Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange”, 9 
European Union Politics 2007, 187-215. 
14   Youngs,  Richard,  The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2010). 
15   Pridham, Geoffrey, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, 
Approach, and Priorities”, 14(3) Democratization 2007, 446-471. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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2004, is today a stable liberal democracy with standards of rights and liberties 
comparable to the other Member States of the European Union. Liberal 
democracy has been established only recently in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, 
and Macedonia. Of these countries, Croatia will join the EU in 2013 and the 
others have made progress toward EU integration, fulfilling the conditions in 
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)
16  framework and becoming 
candidate countries. Kosovo and BiH seem to follow a different path. While 
Kosovo obtained international recognition in 2008, and has only recently 
started its transition as an independent country, BiH is seriously lagging 
behind in its democratization and integration process. Its political regime 
cannot be defined as either authoritarian or democratic; it is a hybrid 
between the two models
17 because, while having some aspects of a liberal 
democracy, such as regular and competitive elections, it fails to meet  the 
substantive aspects of a liberal democracy, or does so only ambiguously.
18 
This kind of polity, which is the most common outcome of the Third Wave of 
democracy,
19 is typical of a transitional phase, but can also persist for more 
than a decade.
20 As Merkel observes, these regimes tend “to form stable links 
to their economic and societal environment and are often seen by 
considerable parts of the elites and the population as an adequate 
institutional solution to the specific problems of governing effectively”.
  21 A 
hybrid regime has good chance of survival “as long as this equilibrium 
between problems, context and power lasts”.
22 A hybrid regime is usually the 
outcome of an electoral process that brought illiberal leaders or extremists 
into power because of the emergence of virulent nationalism and ethnic or 
other types of civil conflict.
23 A hybrid regime reflects, therefore, a ‘rough 
balance’
24  between actors involved in the transition from authoritarian rule, 
a balance where neither side is sufficiently powerful to dictate the rules of 
 
 
16   The Stabilization and Association Process is the framework for EU negotiations with the Western 
Balkan countries. It is a long-term policy that aims to stabilize the countries, encourage their 
transition to a market economy, and promote regional cooperation with the prospect of eventual 
membership of the EU. 
17   Diamond, Larry, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, 13(2) Journal of Democracy  2002, 21-35; 
Carothers, Thomas, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 13(1) Journal of Democracy 2002, 5-21; 
Carothers, Thomas, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”, 18(1) Journal of Democracy 2007, 12-27. 
18   Linn, Karl T., “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America”, 6(3) Journal of Democracy 1995, 72-86; 
Diamond, Larry, “Thinking About Hybrid  Regimes”, 13(2) Journal of Democracy  2002, 21-35; 
Lewitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism”, 13(2) Journal of Democracy 2002, 51–65; Bunce, Valery and Wolchik, Sharon, 
“Mixed Regimes in Postcommunist Eurasia: Tipping Democratic and Tipping Authoritarian”, paper 
presented at the Workshop on Democratization in European Former Soviet Republics, Florence 
(2008); Morlino, Leonardo, “Are There Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion?” 1 (2) 
European Political Science Review 2009, 273-296. 
19   Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University 
of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 1998). 
20   Morlino, Leonardo, “Are There Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion?” 1 (2) European 
Political Science Review 2009, 273-296. 
21   Merkel, Wolfgang, “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, 11(5) Democratization 2004, 1. 
22   Ibid. 
23   Carothers, Thomas, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”, 18(1) Journal of Democracy 2007, 12-27. 
24   Bunce, Valery and Wolchik, Sharon, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 10. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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the political game. The main actors involved in the transition process gain a 
veto power and the only solution is an uneasy compromise that directly 
affects the political institutions and the standard of protection of rights and 
freedoms. Hybrid regimes are, therefore, considered to be only partially free 
and there are limitations on civil and political freedoms, violations of human 
and minority rights, inequality, corruption, and a lack of state effectiveness.  
Accordingly to the Freedom House data, the EU’s promotion of democracy 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been, at best, ineffective. Although BiH 
established relations with the European Union in the framework of the 
enlargement strategy in 1999, the hybrid regime has been remarkably stable, 
and the potential for a sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear. The country 
still faces a heavy democratic deficit and unlike the other former Yugoslav 
countries it seems to be “locked in a limbo”. The political debate remains 
dominated by the main ethno-religious parties, which repeatedly failed to 
adopt the key democratic reforms needed to progress the EU integration 
process. Most recently, the political parties failed to implement the 2009 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which ordered amendments to the BiH Constitution and the 
2001 Electoral Act to remove ethnic and religious discrimination in the state 
institutions and to allow minorities to run for state-level posts, which are 
currently reserved for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The main political parties 
of BiH were unable to reach an agreement on the necessary amendments and 
this led to a 14-month political crisis. A solution was found in December 2011 
with the formation of the central government, but the coalition lasted only 
six months. Therefore there is great uncertainty about the possibility of BiH 
implementing the enlargement agenda and submitting a credible EU 
membership application. Hence, the failure of the EU democracy promotion in 
BiH calls into question the viability of the EU conditionality as a tool to 
promote change in a divided society where the compliance costs exceed the 
benefits associated with the membership. However, it is difficult to view EU 
democracy promotion and the use of conditionality as independent variables 
because complex processes like democratic transition and consolidation are 
ultimately undertaken through domestic actors, institution, and procedures.
25 
Therefore it is necessary to focus on the domestic factors that prevent BiH 
from moving forward in its democratization and Europeanization process. 
 
3. National Identity and Party System in Bosnia Before and 
After the War 
BiH is an exception among the post-communist countries involved in the EU 
enlargement process. While the former communist countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 and the other (former) Yugoslavian states can be 
regarded as nation states, with a leading national majority that share 
 
 
25   Magen, Amichai and Morlino, Leonardo, International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: 
Anchoring Democracy? (Palgrave, London, 2008). Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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common identity features, such as language, culture, history, and religion and 
a common sense of belonging to a certain national community, Bosnia has 
always been considered a major example of multi-ethnic society.
26 During the 
authoritarian communist rule, BiH was one of the constituent republics of the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and due to its unique 
demographic composition, that is, without a clear majority but with three 
main ethnic-religious groups (Bosniaks-Muslims, Serbs-Orthodox, and Croats-
Catholics) and other smaller nationalities, was regarded as a “Yugoslavia en 
miniature”. The different nationalities and ethnic groups were recognized as 
equals in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Socijalistička 
Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (SRBiH) and ethnic representation was granted 
in all the state institutions.
27  The authoritarian regime also promoted a 
common sense of belonging, based on the principle of Tito’s nationality policy 
of ‘brotherhood and unity’ (bratstvo i jedinstvo), in order to avoid the 
emergence of ethno-religious nationalism, which was seen as a threat to the 
regime and to the integrity of both the country and the multi-ethnic society 
itself.
28 Minority and ethnic policy was, therefore, imposed from above and 
due to the strong authoritarian rule this policy was very carefully observed 
and exercised.  
The importance of avoiding the emergence of ethno-religious tensions and 
stressing the principle of ‘brotherhood and unity’ were also confirmed at the 
beginning of the SFRJ dissolution process when the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the SRBiH amended the Constitution in July 1990, with delegates of all 
nationalities involved, in order to introduce democratic principles and 
pluralism into the political system. Article LX of the Constitutional 
Amendment, states that “the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
democratic sovereign State of equal citizens, the people of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Muslims, Serbs and Croats and the members of other peoples 
and nationalities living there” (Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina je 
demokratska suverena drzava ravnopravnih gradana, naroda Bosne i 
Hercegovine  -  Muslimana, Srba i Hrvata i pripadnika drugih naroda i 
narodnosti, koji u njoj zive).
29 In addition, only one language was recognized 
as the official language, that is Serbo-Croatian, both in roman and Cyrillic 
letters,
30  and proportional ethnic representation was granted to the three 
main ethnic groups and the other smaller nationalities.
31 
This situation changed dramatically after the first multiparty elections, 
held in November 1990, when the reformed communist and the other multi-
 
 
26   Marko, Joseph, “Bosnia and Herzegovina –  Multi-Ethnic or Multinational?”, in Council of Europe 
(ed.), Societies in Conflict: The Contribution of Law and Democracy to Conflict Resolution (Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg, 2000), 92-118. 
27   See Art. 3 of the consolidated version of the 1974 SRBiH Constitution. 
28   Andjelic, Neven, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003). 
29   See Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sluzbeni list Socijalisticke 
Republike Bosne i Xercegovine, Br. 32/1991, pos. 357).  
30   Art. 4 of the amended version of the Constitution of the SRBiH, at 
www.republikabih.net/downloads/USTAV_RBIH_LATINICA.pdf.  
31   Constitutional amendment LXI, Sluzbeni list Socijalisticke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine,  br. 
21/1990 Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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ethnic political parties were defeated by the newly formed ethno-religious 
parties – the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA), 
the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka,  (SDS), and the 
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (HDZ)) – that achieved a landslide victory in 
the parliamentary and the presidential elections, as well as at the municipal 
level. During the electoral campaign in 1990, these three parties agreed to 
run together in order to defeat the multi-ethnic, reformed, communist 
political organizations, which were, it was claimed, deeply corrupt and anti-
democratic,
32  and the other multi-ethnic political forces, such as the 
Reformist Party of Ante Markovic. After the first multiparty elections, SDA, 
SDS, and HDZ formed a coalition government, but when it became clear that 
they had conflicting goals about the future status of the country (an 
independent Serb Republic, the Republika Srpska, within the territory of BiH, 
was proclaimed a day before the referendum on independence in 1992) this 
led to war among the three main ethnic groups and to widespread ethnic-
cleansing in order to create ethnically homogenous territories. The Bosnian 
conflict, however, cannot be simply regarded as a civil war, as the Serbs and 
Croats maintained strict relations with their respective kin-states during the 
war. This was confirmed in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) where, under 
US tutelage, a political compromise was achieved by  BiH President Aljia 
Izetbegovic on behalf of the Bosniak-Muslim community, and the Presidents of 
Serbia and Croatia, on behalf of the other two main ethnic groups in BiH. The 
DPA, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, also contains the Constitution of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (in Annex IV), and therefore it is a unique case of a 
constitution not based on a consensual arrangement, but one that was drafted 
by foreign experts and adopted without democratic legitimacy.
33  The DPA 
established a complex system of power-sharing and territorial autonomy that, 
to some extent, reflects the theories of consociational democracy
34 developed 
by Arend Lijphart  in order to accommodate the interests and demands of 
conflicting groups in a deeply divided society.
35 
The DPA-imposed Constitution confirmed the legal existence of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a state,
36 but it modified its internal structure, establishing an 
asymmetrical federative state composed of two entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) with strong 
territorial autonomy and devolution of competences. The division between 
 
 
32   Pejanovic, Mirko, The Political Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-Dayton Period 
(TKD Šahinpašić, Sarajevo, 2007). 
33   Chollet, Derek, The Road to Dayton: U.S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process, May–December 
1995 (Dayton History Project, US Department of State, Washington, 1997). 
34   Marko, Joseph, “Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005–2006”, 5 European Yearbook 
of Minority Issues (Brill, Leiden, 2007), 207 – 218. 
35   According to Lijphart’s approach, a consociational democracy is based upon four pillars: (1) a grand 
coalition of elites from different groups, (2) a veto for each group in important policy areas, (3) 
proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy (Lijphart 1977, 2002). See 
also    Lijphart, Arend “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, 15(2) Journal of Democracy 
2004, 96-109. 
36   See Art 1.1 of the Dayton-Constitution. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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the two entities is based on the so-called inter-entity boundary line,
37 which 
reflects the front line at the end of the war. According to Article III.3 of the 
Constitution, which states that “all governmental functions and powers not 
expressly assigned in this Constitution to the (common) institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities”, central institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have only residual competences on foreign policy, foreign 
trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, international and inter-entity 
criminal law enforcement, and regulation of inter-entity transportation, and 
the budgets of those central institutions depend directly on the two entities, 
which also maintain control over military and police apparatus. The 
institutional arrangements differ in both Entities. According to the 
Constitutions of RS and FBiH, which were adopted in 1992
38 and in 1994
39 
respectively, the former has a centralized system of government, while the 
latter is characterized by a federal arrangement with a strong devolution of 
political power to the cantons, which also have their own constitutions. All 
this creates a complex constitutional framework composed of 13 
constitutions.  
The two entities also differ in the ethnic composition of their populations, 
which were affected by the 1992–1995 war and ethnic-cleansing. As a 
consequence of the conflict and ethnic violence, the distribution of the 
populations has been altered dramatically, with 100,000 people killed, 1.2 
million internally displaced people (IDPs) and the creation of ethnically 
homogeneous areas within the newly independent BiH.
40  The dramatic 
changes are shown by a comparison of the 1991 census results and the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 1997 estimates. The changes also affect the judicial 
and the police apparatus of each entity.
41 
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Table 1: Comparison of the population structures of RS and FBiH (1991–1997)
42 
  Republika Srpska  Federation of BiH 
1991  1997  1991  1997 
Bosniaks  28.77%  2.19%  52.09%  72.61% 
Serbs  54.32%  96.79%  17.62%  2.32% 
Croats  9.39%  1.02%  22.13%  22.27% 
Other  7.53%  0.00%  8.16%  2.38% 
 
Along with territorial autonomy the Constitution also introduced power-
sharing  rules in the central institutions, namely the State Presidency, the 
Parliamentary Assemblies, the Council of Ministers, and the Constitutional 
Court, in order to balance and protect the vital interests
43 of the three main 
ethno-religious groups that took part in the 1992–1995 war, thereby ensuring 
both ethnic proportional representation in the central institutions and a high 
level of self-government for each ethnic constituency.
44 Hence, accordingly to 
the DPA Constitution, only the three main ethno-religious groups are defined 
as ‘constituent people’, while other minority groups, such as Roma, Jews, 
Hungarians, and others who choose to not identify themselves as part of any 
ethnic group, are de facto excluded from ‘constituent power’. Only Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats can claim the protection of the ‘vital interests’ of their 
respective ethnic group and entity and exercise a veto power in all the 
decisions of the central institutions. In addition the DPA-imposed Constitution 
explicitly restricts membership of two elected institutions (the Presidency and 
the House of Peoples) to the constituent people. In conclusion, the 
Constitution established a strict identification of territory, institution, and 
ethnicity that affects party politics and decision-making at the state level and 
contributes to the weakening of the functioning of the central institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
4. Impact of the Dayton Constitution on Party Politics in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Almost 20 years after the DPA was signed, the government system of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has proven to be ineffective. If the overlap between power-
sharing and strong territorial autonomy was seen by the three main ethno-
religious groups as the only solution to end the war, this consociational 
arrangement  resulted in the extremely weak position of the central 
institutions in relation to the entities that are the real decision-making 
centres in the BiH political system.
45 The BiH state can, therefore, be defined 
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as a minimalist state that emerged as the consequence of a lack of consensus 
among the warring parties about how to empower the state with greater 
competences. Moreover, the scope and the strength of the central institutions 
are limited by the lack of legitimacy of the BiH state, which is ultimately the 
result of the international efforts to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina together.
46 
In addition, political debate remains dominated by the three main ethno-
religious parties that emerged in the first round of multiparty elections in 
1990. As noted by Marko,  “instead of a positive elite consensus for co-
operation in order to establish mutual trust through power-sharing, the 
Bosnian party leaders from all of the three ethnic communities formed and 
still form an ethnocratic power cartel based on a negative consensus to block 
each other in the decision-making processes”.
47 Unlike other cases of power-
sharing arrangements, such as Canada and Switzerland, where party 
competition is based along the socio-economical cleavage
48 and there are no 
ethnically homogenous sub-state levels,
49 in Bosnia and Herzegovina power-
sharing and self-government, along with a ethnicity-based party competition, 
have led to persistent deadlock at the central level and have established two, 
de facto, segregated ethnic enclaves within a dysfunctional state. In addition, 
the veto power granted by the Constitution to only the three main ethno-
religious groups and to the entities, to be used to protect the national 
interests, has been mostly used within the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to 
stop the reform process.
50 The entity veto (entitetsko glasanje), in particular, 
has proven to be a powerful tool to block the decision-making of the central 
institutions. Since 1995, the entity veto has been used 160 times – 140 times 
by the representatives of the Republika Srpska – to stop the adoption of state 
laws that were perceived as threats to the national interests of the main 
ethno-religious groups.
51  
If the BiH constitutional framework was adopted to stop the war, after 
almost two decades it has served to constrain the creation of a functioning 
and fully democratic state. Given that “autonomy and  integration are 
functional prerequisites for the maintenance of different ethnic groups and of 
a culturally pluralist social and political system”, and that only autonomy plus 
integration “allows for the institutional organization of equality based on the 
recognition of difference”, it is to be noted that the power-sharing 
arrangements of BiH have failed to foster both the dimensions, leading to a de 
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facto ghettoization instead of to a common recognition of the different ethnic 
groups.
52  Hence, BiH’s institutional arrangements contribute to the 
maintenance of a political regime that is a hybrid of democracy and 
authoritarianism, as well as preventing the country moving forward in the 
process of democratic consolidation. This brings into question the viability of 
power-sharing, not only as tool to stabilize deeply divided societies, but also 
as an adequate institutional framework to foster substantive aspects of 
democracy and to guarantee effective protection of rights and freedoms.  
Accordingly to Choudry, what makes a divided society is that “ethnic 
differences are politically relevant and represent persistent markers of 
political identity and bases for political mobilization. Ethno-cultural diversity 
translates into political fragmentation, political claims are reflected through 
the lens of ethnic identity, and political conflict is synonymous with conflict 
among ethno-cultural groups”.
53  On  the basis of this definition, if power-
sharing in BiH has succeeded “in promoting participation of representatives of 
all significant groups in political decision-making”,
54 at the same time it has 
failed to foster intercommunal peace over communal interests and has had 
the effect of re-enforcing the ethnic cleavage in both the political system and 
society. Public administration and educational systems remain ethnically 
segregated in the two entities, and the return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons to their areas of origin is an open issue because of the lack 
of economic opportunities, inadequate housing, and people’s reluctance to 
return to areas where most residents are of a different ethnicity.
55  In 
addition, loyalty to the BiH state is, at best, weak and it undermines the very 
foundations of social cohesion
56  and a common sense of belonging to the 
broader political community associated with the central state, a community 
in which ethnic differences are not politically relevant and citizens support 
ethnic tolerance.
57 This also prevents the formation of multiple identities, a 
formation that is necessary for a multi-ethnic state and democracy.
58 
All these considerations question the efficacy of territorial approaches to 
balance integration and accommodation
59  and confirm, at least to some 
extent, the criticism that consociational solutions for divided societies can 
further entrench and institutionalize pre-existing sources of division and 
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decrease the incentives for elites to adopt moderate behaviour.
60It may, 
therefore, not be surprising that the Bosnian party system has remained 
dominated by the main ethno-religious parties that were not able to agree to 
reform the DPA Constitution and strengthen the central state institutions.
61 
Every proposal to amend the Constitution is perceived as a threat to the rights 
of Bosnia’s constituent peoples that the ethno-religious parties claim to 
defend. Moreover, every reform´s attempt risks eroding “reserved domains” 
based on ethnic belonging and weakening the very source of power 
legitimation of the ethno-religious parties, which ultimately rests in the 
Dayton Constitution itself. 
Despite strong international support, mainly from the EU and US, every 
comprehensive reform of the BiH Constitution has not been adopted. The 
strongest attempt to amend the Constitution came from the Constitutional 
Court of BiH, which is composed of – accordingly to Annex 4 of the DPA – 
national and international judges. With its landmark decision in 2000 (case U-
5/1998, known as the “constituent peoples” case) that ordered the 
harmonization of the Constitutions of the Entities with the DPA Constitution, 
the Court tried to counteract the ethnic homogenization and foster 
recognition among the different ethnic groups by strengthening individual 
rights and the competencies of the state institutions.
62 However, due to the 
entities’ authorities’ lack of will to implement the ruling, a set of legal 
binding decisions was imposed by HR Wolfgang Petrisch in 2002. 
Although constitutional reforms are seen by the EC Commission as a main 
issue for BiH politicians in order to strengthen the central government before 
it is able to continue the integration process, the different interests of 
political parties continue to prevent the central institutions from adopting 
such reforms and BiH from speaking with one voice vis-à-vis the EU 
institutions. Therefore, BiH as a divided society recovering from post-conflict 
settlement and the constraints of its constitutional framework represent two 
key elements that challenge the impact of EU conditionality because every 
attempt to reform the state directly affects the difficult compromise reached 
among the three main ethnic groups of BiH. Moreover, the decisional deadlock 
and the persistent weakness of the central institutions question the efficacy 
of using EU membership as an incentive to changes in a divided society, as 
well  as a  tool to face nationality-sensitive matters and unresolved post-
conflict issues. 
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5. Constraints on EU Conditionality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Nationality Matters 
The promise of EU membership is the most sizeable incentive that the EU can 
offer to induce democratic changes in non-member countries. Especially 
during the transitions from authoritarian rule in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the perspective of 
EU integration and the use of political conditionality emerged as powerful 
tools to promote democratic reforms and to ensure high standards of 
protection of rights and freedoms comparable to those in the West European 
countries. However, unlike the Eastern Enlargement, in the Western Balkans 
the EU faces difficulties with countries suffering from unsettled statehood and 
nationality issues.
63  Following the break-up of the SFRJ, all the Balkan 
countries emerging from this dissolution process inherited national minorities, 
secessionist threats, and unsettled borders, all of which represent major 
obstacles for the creation of stable and fully democratic states (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, p. 366). In order to face these state- and nation-building-related 
issues, the EU has attached great importance to the fact that addressing 
unsettled problems of statehood should be considered as a precondition to 
fulfil the political criteria that require the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities as necessary conditions for integration in the EU.
64 
This was the aim of the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), but 
the  difficulties the enlargement process faced in the Western Balkan 
countries brought into question the efficacy of the EU approach and the 
impact of the conditionality tool on divided societies recovering from violent 
conflict. As noted by Pridham: 
it may be said the EU faces in the Western Balkans first-order 
democratization concerns, such as those relating to state-building, while 
having to confront problems of regional stability deriving from recent war 
as well as difficulties of political consensus, ethnic harmony, and socio-
economic development far more taxing than in East–Central Europe at a 
similar stage a decade ago. In other words, conditionality has had to deal 
with questions that relate more to democratic transition than just 
democratic consolidation. This has had the effect of further expanding the 
conditionality agenda; however, at the same time, it has made the 
reinforcing process of conditionality with respect to democratization 
rather more difficult.
65 
Especially in BiH, the use of the conditionality tool, along with the promise 
of EU membership, has been largely ineffective in attempts to overcome the 
lack of commitment by political elites to adopt democratic reforms and 
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implement the integration agenda.
66 In order to strengthen the effectiveness 
of BiH institutions, the EU has used the conditionality tool to demand changes 
to the internal balance of power between the central government and the 
two entities. However, every reform of the complex institutional framework 
established in Dayton risks reopening unsettled issues and is perceived as a 
threat to the interests of the main ethnic groups of BiH, which still maintain a 
low level of intra-communal trust. This puts the focus on the role of the 
domestic political élites, which are ultimately responsible for the decisional 
deadlock that affects the BiH central institutions. Unlike the countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the domestic élites in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have failed to comply with the conditions set by the EU and the membership 
perspective has been a limited incentive for political parties to pursuit the 
reforms needed for the integration process. EU conditionality can be 
considered as an interactive process between the EU and the applicant 
countries
67  and driven by domestic elites and administrations.
68  The EU 
accession process is based on the interaction between the domestic political 
elites and EU officials that rely on elected representatives to coherently 
implement necessary reforms. Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s 
external incentive model, EU political conditionality is expected to induce 
change in non-member countries when the political costs of compliance with 
EU requirements do not exceed the benefits linked to membership.
69 In other 
worlds, there is a trade-off between compliance costs and accession benefits, 
which depends on: (i) the determinacy of conditions, (ii) the size and speed of 
rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and promises, and (iv) the amount of 
adoption costs.
70 Hence, accordingly to this model, in BiH the political élites 
perceive the costs of compliance with EU conditionality as very high because 
the set of conditions of membership touch on sensitive issues of statehood 
and national identity and affect the difficult compromise reached in Dayton 
under US tutelage by the three main ethno-religious groups of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
71  Therefore, domestic political elites continue to use ethno-
nationalist arguments, resist adopting domestic reform, and have so far failed 
to cooperate across ethnic lines. National identity emerges as a key factor in 
BiH that works as a filter for governmental action,
72 affects the compliance 
patters of domestic élite, and prevents the fostering of moderate and EU-
oriented attitudes among the BiH main political parties. Hence, EU conditions 
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on nationality-sensitive issues have limited potential to work in BiH because a 
broad consensus among national elites is needed to adopt the demanded 
reforms as a necessary requisite for meaningful compliance with EU 
conditionality.
73 
 
6. Reform of the Police System: Inconsistent Compliance with 
EU Conditions 
In order to overcome the central institutions’ decisional deadlock, the EU has 
constantly addressed the need for the political parties to reach a consensus 
on a shared vision of the future of the country in order to prove that they are 
capable of engaging constructively in the integration process. This 
commitment has been repeatedly expressed since 2002 in the annual progress 
reports of the European Commission (EC). Most recently, this was stated in 
the 2011 EC Progress Report on Bosnia, according to which “a shared vision by 
the political representatives on the overall direction and future of the country 
and its institutional setup is lacking. The EU accession process requires 
political will and functional institutions at all levels with an effective 
coordination mechanism on EU matters.” However, EU-demanded reforms and 
conditions have fostered an opposite result. Rather than being a strong 
incentive to reach a consensus, the EU conditions have increased the tensions 
among the main parties on nationality-sensitive issues. The most striking 
example of the limits of EU conditionality is the impasse over the reform of 
the police system, which was considered by the European Commission as a 
necessary precondition for the conclusion of a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA).
74 The struggle of the police reform process clearly shows 
the limited impact of the EU conditionality on nationality-sensitive issues.  
The EU’s efforts to promote policing reform were first addressed in the 
2003 Feasibility Study on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. 
Police reform should be adopted in accordance with three basic criteria in 
order to strengthen state-level competences, with emphasis on efficiency and 
operational aspects. The three principles established by the EC as guidelines 
for the reform process provided a shift of competences from the entity to the 
state level, with exclusive state-level competences for the police, the 
elimination of political interference by the police, and a reorganization of the 
police system using purely technical and professional criteria.
75  The link 
between police reform and the integration process could act, as is the 
intention of the EU Commission, as an incentive to transform into a single 
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state body the very fragmented police system created by the Dayton 
Agreement, which established a highly decentralized police system with no 
competences granted to the state institutions. However, the EU-demanded 
reform of the police system touched one of the key aspects of the DPA and, 
therefore, remained vulnerable to political pressure, especially from the 
Republika Srpska, which opposed the Bosniak proposal to abolish the separate 
police structure of the Serb entity that was formally recognized within the 
framework of the Dayton Constitution. Between 2004 and 2005, the 
representatives of RS constantly  rejected any reform proposal as 
unconstitutional and BiH was, therefore, not able to meet the deadline set by 
the European Commission to start the negotiations of the SAA. This led to the 
first impasse between the BiH parties, which was overcome only after the RS 
National Assembly adopted an agreement on police reform and restructuring 
on 5 October 2005 (the so-called October Agreement). This was subsequently 
adopted without any changes by the FBiH Parliamentary Assembly and, at the 
state level, by the House of Representatives and the House of People on 14 
and 18 October respectively. Following the consensus reached among the BiH 
parties, the EC recommended the start of the SAA negotiations, which 
officially commenced on 5 November 2005 in Sarajevo. Although the 
agreement accepted the three criteria laid down by the European 
Commission, it did not contain any proposals for how to restructure the police 
organization, and there was no mention about the crossing of the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line. Consensus was reached about the fact that any substantial 
decision on the police reform should be postponed for up to five years. The 
weakness of the October Agreement emerged in early 2006, when a draft 
proposal on police reform was not adopted by the BiH parliamentary 
assemblies. National elections in 2006 further exacerbated differences among 
the main ethno-religious parties, which retreated to diametrically opposed 
positions about the future status of the country. 
Despite all the efforts of the EC to maintain the debate along technical 
lines, ethno-nationalist rhetoric flourished during the electoral campaign and 
police reform emerged as a main dividing issue among the BiH parties. After 
the elections the new prime minister of the RS, Milorad Dodik, rejected all 
previously reached agreements on police reform, leading to another deadlock 
in decision-making at the state level. During 2007, the major political parties 
repeatedly failed to agree on police reform, and decision-making at the state 
level was almost completely stopped, preventing the country from taking the 
necessary steps to fulfil the conditions set in the SAP framework. In light of 
the deadlock, the EC warned BiH political parties that without an agreement 
on police reform in accordance with the EU's three principles, the EU would 
be unable to conclude a SAA with BiH. Once again, the political impasse was 
overcome when leaders of the six main parties gathered in Mostar on 27 
October 2007 and jointly declared their commitment to move forward in the 
reform of the police system.
76 Following the ‘Mostar declaration’, the main 
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BiH parties agreed on an action plan in Sarajevo, which incorporated the 
three principles laid down by the EC. Subsequently, the ‘Law on Independent 
and Supervisory Bodies of the Police Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and 
the ‘Law on the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies and Agencies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ were adopted in April 2008, but the political parties 
again failed to achieve consensus on a detailed timeline for necessary actions 
to implement the police reform. Criticism was expressed by the EC in its 2008 
progress report in which it stated: “there has been some progress in reforming 
the police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the fragmentation of 
the police  has not been addressed. Cooperation and information exchange 
between law enforcement agencies remain weak.” Nevertheless, the plan was 
accepted by the European Union as a sign of the commitment of the BiH 
political elites to adopt the EU-demanded reforms, and the SAA was signed in 
June 2008. However, after the agreement was signed the weakness of the 
consensus emerged once again and the political parties returned to 
obstruction and mutual accusations, leading again to deadlock at state level. 
After the consensus was reached in April 2008, no further steps were taken to 
implement the police reform. The main political parties decided that any 
decision to restructure the police system would not be taken until a new 
constitution for the country was agreed, but the 2006 ‘April package’, as well 
as the ‘Prud process’ and the so-called ´Butmir process´ have failed to 
produce concrete results.
77  The Serb authorities, in particular, remain 
reluctant to merge the RS police force into a unique state body as long as any 
attempt to reform the police system is perceived as a direct challenge to the 
Serb national interests.  
The 2010 general elections, the second election since the Dayton 
Agreement to be entirely administered by the authorities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, led to a 15-month political crisis that ended on 29 December 
2011 with an agreement between the BiH parties on the formation of the 
central government. However, the police reform remained an open issue, 
which shows that the reward of EU membership does not outweigh the costs 
connected to the EU-demanded reforms, especially when these reforms affect 
nationality-sensitive issues and are perceived to threaten the national 
interests of the main BiH ethno-religious groups. The use of the EU 
conditionality has produced no compliance, or an inconsistent compliance, by 
the political parties with the conditions established by the European 
Commission.
78    Moreover, the strict use of conditionality on nationality-
sensitive issues has increased inter-ethnic polarization and disputes and 
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further weakened the decision-making process at the central level, thus 
preventing BiH from implementing the integration agenda. 
 
7. Sejdić and Finci vs BiH: The Same Mistake Again? 
Another major case of inconsistent or no compliance with the EU 
conditionality on nationality-sensitive issues is the implementation of the 
ECtHR decision in the Sejdić v Finci case. On 22 December 2009, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR declared the restrictions on standing for election to 
the House of Peoples and to the State Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
violation of Article 14 (non-discrimination) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), as well of Article 3 of Protocol No.1 ECHR (right to free 
elections) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 ECHR (general prohibition of 
discrimination).
79 As stated by the Court, the DPA-imposed Constitution grants 
the right to be eligible for election to high offices at state level only to BiH 
citizens who declare themselves to belong to one of the constituent peoples 
of BiH, namely the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The same right is not given to 
the BiH minorities and to BiH citizens who do not declare themselves to 
belong to any ethnic group. The case was brought to the Court by Dervo 
Sejdić and Jakob Finci, two prominent Bosnian citizens of Roma and Jewish 
origins, respectively, who could not run for elections because of their 
ethnicity. The judgment condemned BiH for discrimination against its ethnic 
minorities, ordering it to amend the Constitution, as well as the 2001 Election 
Act provisions violating the ECHR.
80 The ECtHR ruling is a landmark decision 
that requires the removal of the institutional discrimination of the Dayton 
Constitution against minorities and provides an opportunity to improve the 
existing system in order to ensure substantive equality of individual and 
collective rights to all citizens of BiH.
81  The implementation of the 
judgement, however, represents a difficult issue for BiH political leaders to 
deal with because it would directly affect the balance amongst the political 
parties, the entities, and the main ethno-religious groups of BiH. Following 
the ECtHR’s binding decision, the ratification of the SAA between BiH and the 
EU was stopped and the harmonization of the DPA- Constitution with the ECHR 
was added by the EC as a necessary condition for BiH to fulfil in order to move 
forward in the integration process. So far however, BiH’s main political 
parties have struggled to adopt the necessary EU-demanded reforms and have 
failed to reach a consensus. Although all parties accepted the necessity of 
implementing  the  Sejdić  and  Finci  judgment  and  amending  both  the 
Constitution and the Electoral Act in order to remove formal discriminations, 
they have been unable to reach an agreement on a substantive proposal and 
timeline. As a result of the government crisis, during 2010 and 2011 no real 
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effort was made to implement the ECtHR decision. According to the 2011 
Progress Report of the EU Commission (p.4): 
the overall pace of reforms has been very limited. Respect for democratic 
principles and the right to equal treatment without discrimination, as 
embodied in the ECHR, remain essential requirements of the Interim 
Agreement and of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The lack of 
a credible process for the harmonization of the Constitution with the 
European Court of Human Rights decision of December 2009 in the Sejdic 
and Finci case, remains an issue of serious concern.  
Despite the formation of the new state government in late 2011, leaders of 
the BiH political parties failed to reach an agreement and although a special 
parliamentary committee was established and tasked to establish 
amendments to the constitution, its mandate ran out on 12 March 2012 
without  concrete  results.  Talks  on  implementation  of  the  Sejdić  and  Finci 
judgment stopped when the government coalition between the Social 
Democratic Party of BiH (Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne I Hercegovine, SPD 
BiH) and SDA broke down little more than two months later, on 31 May 2012, 
after the annual state budget was approved by the House of Peoples. In 
conclusion, although the EC moved the Sejdić and Finci judgment to the top 
of the agenda, the inconsistent compliance of the BiH political élites shows 
once again the limited impact of the conditionality tool on the promotion of 
key reforms. Most recently, efforts to promote an agreement were made on 
27 June 2012 at the High Level Meeting for the Accession Process between the 
new Enlargement Commissioner, Štefan Füle, and the leaders of the six main 
political parties of BiH. At this meeting, the BiH leaders agreed on a Road Map 
with a list of obligations that the country has to meet by given deadlines to 
remove the last obstacles for a Decision of the EU Council on the entry into 
force of the SAA. A proposal to implement the ECtHR judgment should be 
submitted to the BiH Parliamentary Assemblies by August 31 2012 and the 
Constitution should be amended by November 2012. Moreover, both the EU 
and OSCE have warned that they would not recognize the results of the local 
elections scheduled for 7 October 2012 or the 2014 parliamentary elections as 
long as the BiH government does not amend discriminatory provisions in the 
Constitution and the electoral law. However, the new government coalition 
has not been able to meet the deadline set by the EC. The October local 
elections polarized the positions of the main ethno-religious groups and there 
is serious concern that no real attempt would be made to remove restrictions 
on ethnic minorities running for office before the 2014 parliamentary 
elections.   
 
8. Conclusion 
As shown by the police reform and the implementation of the ECtHR ruling in 
Sejdić and Finci, EU conditionality on nationality-sensitive issues has, so far, 
been ineffective and compliance with the conditions set by the EU has been 
inconsistent or absent. The BiH political parties have been able to agree only 
on general commitments, but have failed to take substantive steps to Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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implement the reforms and move forward in the EU integration process. If the 
membership perspective was an important incentive for democratic changes 
in the CEECs countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2007, in BiH, nationality has 
emerged as a decisive filter for the main political actors and a substantial 
constraint on the EU conditionality. The benefits of integration are 
outweighed by the political costs of EU-demanded reforms. The strict use of 
conditionality on nationality-sensitive issues has increased tensions among the 
main parties rather than being a strong incentive to reach the broad 
consensus necessary to implement the EU-demanded reforms. Every attempt 
to force BiH parties to cooperate led to stalemate in state-level decision-
making and increased inter-ethnic polarization and disputes, further 
undermining the BiH path toward EU integration. Moreover, it prevented the 
BiH political elites from adopting and implementing the reforms needed to 
create a functioning and fully democratic state, and contributed to 
maintaining the status quo. All these considerations question the viability of 
the conditionality tool as a workable means to induce democratic changes in 
divided societies, but also suggest moving toward a revised EU strategy to 
promote constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vettori – Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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